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Dispute Settlement in the Law
of the Sea Convention:
The Military Activities Exception
MARK W. JANIS*
Abstract This paper considers the military activities exception
in the settlement of disputes part of the Law-of-the-Sea Conference's
Informal Single Negotiating Text. It notes that although the excep-
tion, on its face, seems to favor naval powers, in practice it would
not. The emerging rules of the law of the sea are favorable to naval
operations and it is more likely that the military activities exception
would be used by coastal states resisting superpower naval activities.
The military activities exception will remove activities from dispute
settlement procedures which are almost certainly in need of peaceful
resolution.
The most concrete result of eight years of law-of-the-sea negotiations is the
Informal Single Negotiating Text which issued from the diplomatic discussions
leading up to and including the 1975 Geneva session of the United Nations'
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS 1Il).' The Informal Single
Negotiating Text consists of three substantive parts each prepared by one of the
chairmen of the three main committees of the Conference and a fourth part
concerning dispute settlement presented by the co-chairmen of the Informal
Working Group on Settlement of Disputes.' Although the president of the
conference has characterized the Informal Single Negotiating Text as merely a
"procedural device" which will "only provide a basis for negotiation,"3 the four
parts of the Text may very well be in the shape of things to come and should be
discussed and, when necessary, criticized so that the emerging order of the
oceans best facilitates the uses of the seas by all states with a minimum amount
of conflict.
*Mark W. Janis is a J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Volume 4, Number 1
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The work of LOS III has been authoritatively presented in three articles
co-authored by the Chief of the U.S. Delegation, Ambassador John R. Steven-
son, and the U.S. Representative in Committee II, Bernard H. Oxman.4 This
paper does not attempt to duplicate that record. Nor does the paper venture to
cover the ground ably covered by the two articles on settlement of disputes
written by members of the Informal Working Group on Settlement of Disputes,
one by the Rapporteur, Professor Louis B. Sohn, and another by Co-Chairman
A. 0. Adede of Kenya.s
This paper is focused on a single clause of the settlement of disputes section
of the Informal Single Negotiating Text: Part IV, Article 18, Section 2(c). This
clause is within a section that begins:
When ratifying the present Convention, or otherwise expressing its consent to
be bound by it, a Contracting Party may declare that it does not accept some
or all of the procedures for the settlement of disputes specified in the present
Convention with respect to one or more of the following categories of
disputes:6
Article 18, Section 2(c) is the third of four such exceptions which may be made
to dispute settlement procedures. It concerns:
Disputes concerning military activities, including those by Government vessels
and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, it being understood that law
enforcement activities pursuant to the present Convention shall not be
considered military activities.7
Although Article 18, Section 2(c) is only one short element among many
others in the Informal Single Negotiating Text, it is an especially crucial clause.
Military activities have been one of the maritime interests which the great
powers have been particularly diligent in protecting in the law-of-the-sea de-
bate.' Should the United States support the retention of Article 18, Section 2(c)
in the Law-of-the-Sea Convention? If the clause is retained, should the United
States elect the military activities exception? This paper argues that the United
States should do neither.
Two analyses follow. First, the military activities exception is examined in
context and compared with other military exceptions in other treaties. Second,
the implications of Article 18, Section 2(c) for U.S. policy are considered and
the conclusion is drawn that the clause poses many more problems than it is
worth.
The Military Activities Exception
in the Informal Single Negotiating Text
Article 18, Section 2(c) is part of an article which seems to represent the
compromise position between those favoring compulsory dispute settlement in
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all cases -and those favoring a policy permitting some exceptions. Although the
working papers of the Informal Working Group on the Settlement of Disputes
have not been published,9 some background to these negotiations has been
provided in the articles by Sohn and Adede. Unfortunately, neither considers
Article 18 in any depth, both devoting about two pages of text to it and most of
this is given to verbatim rendition of the various proposals leading up to Article
18.10 Still, the two articles are interesting both for what they have in common
and the ways in which they differ. Sohn's is the earlier piece. He reports that
there were three points of view-no exceptions permitted, exceptions to some or
all parts of the Convention or to some dispute settlement procedures permitted,
or only some explicitly specified exceptions permitted." Although Sohn does
not name his own preference, the language of the article implies that he himself
prefers the first option:
Some delegations believe that the integrity of the compromise package to be
embodied in the Law-of-the-Sea Convention needs to be preserved at all cost
and that effective dispute settlement provisions are needed, applicable with-
out exception to all parts of the Convention.12
Adede also finds three points of view about exceptions to dispute settlement
procedures, but they are slightly different than those of Sohn, to wit: no excep-
tions permitted, a limited category of exceptions permitted, or exceptions for
"any dispute relating to a matter which falls within the national jurisdiction of a
coastal state." 3 Although Adede seems to favor his middle (Sohn's last) option,
he stresses the need:
to protect coastal states from constant harassment by being dragged into
courts by those who are seeking to challenge the regulatory and enforcement
measures undertaken by a coastal state within the economic zone. 14
This is the single point challenged by Stevenson & Oxman in their preceding
article on the Geneva session. For the rest they defer to Mr. Adede, but here
they argue:
Attempts were made at Geneva to exclude the economic zone as a whole
from compulsory dispute settlement. These attempts were strongly, widely,
and properly resisted. ...
This is not a peripheral or procedural issue; it is substantive. If states cannot
resort to international adjudicatory procedures to protect their rights, they
are ultimately faced with the same problems arising from unilateral treaty
interpretation that arise from unilateral claims.' 5
Sohn and Stevenson & Oxman, then, seem to promote "effective dispute
settlement procedures," while Adede stresses the need to protect coastal states
from "constant harassment by being dragged into court." Is Article 18 a
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battleground between the maritime powers and the coastal states? If so. how
does the military activities exception fit in, for does it not, on its face, tend to
favor navies and thus naval powers?
Historically, military exceptions to general rules of the law of the sea have cut
both ways, sometimes favoring naval powers, sometimes favoring coastal states.
This two-sided nature is easily seen.in the treatment of "The Legal Regime of
Warships" in C. John Colombos's classical text on the law of the sea. 16
Colombos shows that, in times of peace, naval operations have been subject to
both greater and lesser coastal state regulation than nonmilitary operations. He
feels that coastal states have special power to exclude warships from their
waters:
Although both the Institute of International Law and the International Law
Association grant on principle the right of passage through territorial waters
to public as well as private vessels, a distinction ought to be drawn between
warships and merchant vessels. The reason for granting this right to merchant
vessels is mainly that sea navigation ought to be free and that trade com-
munications should not be interrupted between the various parts of the
world. In the case of warships, this reason is lacking. Moreover, the presence
of powerful warships in territorial waters and only three miles distant from
shore may prove a serious danger to small nations. It is, therefore, reasonable
to concede to a State the right to enact regulations regarding the passage of
foreign warships through its territorial waters, if considerations based on its
safety and protection justify it.1 7
The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone's Article 23
also makes a special case of warships:
If any warship does not comply with the regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance which is made to it, the coastal State may require the warship to
leave the territorial sea.ia
Here, then, is an example of a military exception. albeit not to dispute settle-
ment, which cuts against the naval power and for the coastal state.
Of course, military exceptions to maritime law may favor the naval power.
Colombos expresses the familiar doctrine of sovereign immunity:
The general doctrine is, therefore, that a warship remains under the exclusive
jurisdiction of her flag-State during her entry and stay in foreign ports and
waters. No legal proceedings can be taken against her either for recovery of
possession or for damages for collision or for a salvage reward, or for any
other cause, and no official of the territorial State is permitted to board the
vessel against the wishes of her commander.' 9
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There are numerous examples of such immunity exceptions to maritime treaties.
The Brussels Convention of 1910, for example, concerning Collisions at Sea
provides in Article 11:
This convention does not apply to ships of war or to Government ships
appropriated exclusively to a public service. 20
And the Brussels Convention of 1926 which subjected most state-owned ships of
ratifying countries to the same rules of liability as pertained to privately-owned
vessels stated in Article III:
The provisions of the two preceding Articles shall not apply to ships of war,
state-owned yachts, patrol vessels, hospital ships, fleet auxiliaries, supply
ships and other vessels owned or operated by a State and employed exclu-
sively at the time when the cause of action arises on Government and
non-commercial service, and such ships shall not be subject to seizure, arrest
or detention by any legal process, nor to any proceedings in rem.2 1
Two modem examples of the military immunity exception to maritime rules are
particularly interesting because the treaties contain provision for dispute settle-
ment. The London Convention of 1973, the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, which was drafted under the auspices of the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, provides in Article 3,
Section 3:
The present Convention shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary or
other ship owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on
government noncommercial service. However, each Party shall ensure by the
adoption of appropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational
capabilities of such ships owned or operated by it, that such ships act in a
manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with the present
Convention.22
The Helsinki Convention of 1974, the Convention on the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, adds aircraft but has identical
wording in its Article 4. Very similar wording regarding pollution is also to be
found in Part III, Article 42 of the Informal Single Negotiating Text:
The provisions of Chapters Six and Seven shall not apply to any warship,
naval auxiliary or other vessel owned or operated by a State and used, for the
time being, only on government noncommercial service. However, each State
shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing the
operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or other craft owned or
operated by it, that such vessels or other craft act in a manner consistent, so
far as is reasonable and practicable, with Chapters Six and Seven. 24
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Although the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone did
not mention immunity for warships, the Informal Single Negotiating Text in
Part II, Article 31 provides that:
Subject to articles 29, 30, and 32, nothing in these provisions affects the
immunities which warships enjoy under these provisions or other rules of
international law.25
Does the military activities exception of the Informal Single Negotiating Text
more closely resemble the exceptional power of the coastal state to exclude
warships from territorial waters; or does Article 18, Section 2(c) more closely
resemble the traditional sovereign immunity of warships? In short, does the
clause tend to favor the coastal state or the naval power? Neither? Both? Earlier
drafts of the clause indicate that it was probably first conceived as a boon to the
naval powers. Alternative B.1's (e) and Alternative B.2's (d) read:
Disputes concerning military activities [unless the State conducting such
activities gives its express consent] .
The bracketed provision points to the fact that it would be the naval power
which would normally oppose dispute settlement procedures.
Another indication that what was meant to be protected here was sovereign
immunity is the deleted provision, B.1 (d) and B.2 (c):
Disputes concerning vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under
international law, and similar cases in which sovereign immunity applies
under international law.2 7
Article 18, Section 2(c) does refer to "Government vessels and aircraft engaged
in noncommercial service," 28 but this only includes those engaged in "military
activities," e.g., those doing military research. Article 18, Section 2(c) is the only
surviving sovereign immunity section.
But can we trust to good intentions? Once included, for whatever reason,
does Article 18, Section 2(c) tend to benefit the naval power and not the coastal
state? Not necessarily. If the naval power is generally satisfied with the pro-
visions of the Law-of-the-Sea Convention as a whole, as they pertain to naval
operations, then it is probably the coastal state that benefits from the military
activities exception. If the coastal state decides that the Convention gives the
naval power too much mobility in its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone,
it can choose to elect Article 18, Section 2(c). In this case, the coastal state
could interfere with the naval operations of the naval power but the naval power
could not bring the coastal state to compulsory dispute settlement. This would
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be no great detriment for the naval power if it was in a position to exert its
relative physical advantage, but, if for one of a great variety of possible reasons,
it was restrained from doing so, the naval power would effectively forfeit the
beneficial terms of the Law-of-the-Sea Convention. This, the next section argues,
is precisely the position of the United States.
The Military Activities Exception
and United States Ocean Policy
In order to judge the value of the military activities exception for the United
States it is necessary to evaluate the naval implications of the prospective
Law-of-the-Sea Convention. For this purpose the Informal Single Negotiating
Text is a good guide, for the articles of the Text which are most important for
the United States Navy seem, with one exception, to be some of those which are
most settled and nearest to becoming the new law of the sea. Official U.S. naval
policy sets out four missions for the Navy: strategic deterrence, sea control,
projection of power ashore, and naval presence.29 A fifth mission, scientific
research, is also very important to the navy and might be added to the list. The
law-of-the-sea issues most crucial for these five missions relate to rights of
navigation and research.
Perhaps the most important issue for the navy is passage through straits.
Some 121 straits, including such key waterways as Gibraltar, Dover, and
Malacca, fall within 12-mi, though not 3-mi, territorial seas. 0 Traditional
international law provides only a right of innocent passage through straits
covered by territorial waters. Not only, according to Colombos, are states
bordering straits "entitled to take all precautions required for its security" in
these waters,3 ' but the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone requires submarines to navigate on the surface and to show
their flags.3 Furthermore, innocent passage includes no right of overflight.
Innocent passage regimes for those 121 new straits would have important
consequences for all four U.S. naval missions. With regard to strategic deter-
rence, innocent passage regimes would have a greater effect upon the navy's
carrier-based nuclear weapons than its SSBN fleet (nuclear submarines armed
with inter-continental ballistic missiles). A study by Professor Robert E. Osgood
has demonstrated that, because of the increasing range of their missiles, innocent
passage regimes
although imposing some hardships on the operations of the U.S. SSBN fleet,
would not seriously weaken its contribution to nuclear deterrence.33
But U.S. carrier-based nuclear weapons in the Mediteranean and the Indian
Ocean would be seriously affected by restrictive regimes for Gibraltar and
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Malacca. These forces are a visible show of the U.S. commitment "to deter all
out attack on the United States or its allies."3 If straits states such as Spain and
Morocco, Indonesia and Malaysia were able to restrict the movement of U.S.
carrier forces for reasons of their own determinations of national security, the
effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear commitment could be threatened especially in
times of crisis, precisely the time when straits states would be under the most
pressure, internal and external, to limit passage. New innocent passage regimes
could also adversely affect the other three U.S. naval missions. This can most
easily be seen by looking at the operations of the Navy's Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean. The only reasonable access for the Sixth Fleet is through the
Straits of Gibraltar; Suez is too far from United States home ports and under the
control of a state not always friendly to U.S. interests. Since its formation and
deployment in 1948, the Sixth Fleet has not only provided an important part of
the U.S. strategic deterrent, but has been active in all three of the more
conventional roles.3 s It has been instrumental in the control of sea lanes, for
example, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War with the resupply of Israel. If passage
through Gibraltar had been restricted then, there is more than a reasonable
chance that the straits states, under oil pressure, would have limited U.S.
shipping and overflight intended for Israel. The Sixth Fleet has also projected
power ashore, for example, during the 1958 Lebanon crisis. And the Sixth Fleet
has always been perceived as a crucial U.S. naval presence, demonstrating United
States support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and for friendly states
in the Middle East. Discretionary rights for coastal states over Gibraltar not only
would increase any doubts about the U.S. commitment and ability to act in the
Mediterranean, but it would put new pressure on the straits states to limit U.S.
naval operations in the sea. The strait next to Gibraltar in importance are
Malacca and the other Indonesian straits. These cut more than a week of transit
time in the passage of ships from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Both the
United States and Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean is growing. 36
Although the wisdom of the naval presence is hotly disputed both in the United
States and out, insofar as it has been decided to maintain a presence in the
Indian Ocean, the conventional as well the strategic missions of the Navy will be
affected by the regime of the Indonesian straits.
What then are the interests of the United States in naval passage through
straits, and do the provisions of the Informal Single Negotiating Text satisfy the
interests? The naval interest is clearly to maintain a right of passage through
international straits for naval forces that can not be limited, especially in a time
of crisis, by the straits state. Although the Navy would probably have the
physical capacity to transit Gibraltar or the Indonesian straits if opposed, the
narrow waters of a strait are excellent for the assertion of power by a weaker
navy which can then use both land-based air and gun power as well as shore-
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based patrol boats to good advantage. In any event, in a crisis situation, the
United States or any country strives to reduce hostility of otherwise uninvolved
third parties, including coastal states or states which might sympathize with
coastal states or complain of naval passage. Part II, Articles 34-43 of the
Informal Single Negotiating Text establish a new right called transit passage
which appears to satisfy the Navy's need." The vital rule in Article 38 which
provides that in international straits (which would include Gibraltar and the
Indonesian straits) "all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which
shall not be impeded."" The transit passage articles sensibly strike a balance
between the important interests of the straits state in the safety of navigation
and the prevention of pollution39 and the need of flag states for unimpeded
passage. Article 43 reads:
A Strait State shall not hamper transit passage and shall give appropriate
publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight within or over the strait of
which it has knowledge. There shall be no suspension of transit passage. 4 0
Unlike the innocent passage rules, the proposed rules for transit passage permit
the passage of aircraft 4' and make no requirement for submarines to pass on the
surface. These are two importance improvements for the Navy.
The naval implications of the transit passage provisions of the Informal Single
Negotiating Text are, therefore, very favorable. The United States has often
insisted that there could be no satisfactory law-of-the-sea treaty without a
comparable provision. John Norton Moore, the Chairman of the Inter-Agency
Task Force on the Law of the Sea, expressed this insistence at the Caracas
session of the Law-of-the-Sea Conference in 1974:
The U.S. delegation has stated on numerous occasions the central importance
that we attach to a satisfactory treaty regime of unimpeded transit through
and over straits used for international navigation. Indeed for states bordering
as well as states whose ships and aircraft transit such straits, there could not
be a successful Law-of-the-Sea Conference unless this question is satisfactorily
resolved4
Why should the United States insist on such a transit provision only to have the
same problems arise from unilateral treaty interpretation that arise from unilat-
eral claims (to borrow the language of Stevenson & Oxman for a different
purpose)? 4 3 Why permit the straits states to interpret, if they care to, transit
passage to mean something very close to innocent passage and to decide that
United States naval passages violate Part II, Article 39, Section 1?:
Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage shall:
(a) proceed without delay through the strait;
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(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of a strait State or in any other manner in
violation of the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal
modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered neces-
sary by force majeure or by distress."
Certainly it would be preferable for the United States to have the opportunity to
refer a disputed passage to arbitration or judicial settlement than to have the
passage resisted by force at the time of crisis. When the crisis has ended the
legality of the passage can be viewed more coolly by all sides. It would be
preferable to establish international standards for transit passage through inter-
national dispute settlement than to allow the straits states to make their own
unilateral standards. After all, it is such unilateral standards that the United
States has striven to avoid by the successful conclusion of a comprehensive
law-of-the-sea treaty.
Next to straits, the key issue for U.S. naval interests in the law-of-the-sea
negotiations is the width of the territorial sea. Although 12-mi territorial seas
would have little effect on any U.S. naval operations other than passage through
straits, 200-mi territorial seas, as advocated by some, could radically transform
the very nature of naval mobility. These 200-mi territorial seas would cover at
least some 30% of all ocean surface.4s And 200-mi zones would put the
Mediterranean, the North Sea, the South China Sea, and the Caribbean within
national jurisdictions.46 The greater the extent of territorial seas, the lesser the
domain in which the United States Navy may transit freely. Although most
states seem willing to accept 12-mi territorial seas, it seems very likely that
200-mi Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) will be established. The United States
and others are worried that these 200-mi EEZs will creep and become territorial
seas limiting navigation rights. When the United States announced its willingness
to accept 200-mi EEZs at Caracas in 1974, the Chief of the U.S. Delegation,
John R. Stevenson, made it clear that this was conditional on the protection of
transit rights through the EEZ:
Our willingness and that of many other delegations to accept a 200-mile outer
limit for the economic zone depends on the concurrent negotiation and
acceptance of correlative coastal state duties.
The coastal rights we contemplate comprise full regulatory jurisdiction over
the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources, non-resource drilling,
fishing for coastal and anadromous species, and installations constructed for
economic purposes.
The rights of other states include freedom of navigation, overflight, and other
non-resource uses.
4 7
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If the EEZ crept to include the right to govern transit, the naval implications
would be dangerous. The operations of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and
those of the Seventh Fleet in the South China Sea would be within the waters of
numerous coastal states. Depending on their attitude to the United States and
their own determinations of their security, the coastal states could attempt to
use innocent passage rules for these waters and exclude U.S. naval operations.
Such an attempt would either force the Navy from these areas, thereby diminish-
ing the U.S. commitment, or lead to unnecessary and tension-building confronta-
tions between the United States Navy and coastal forces. Naval passage along the
west coast of Africa, which might be necessary in some circumstances to protect
vital shipping lanes would entail transit across more than 20 African EEZs. If
each state could choose different rules for passing vessels, the result would be
confusion and, again, possible conflict. Obviously, the United States naval
interest in the regime of territorial waters and EEZs calls for rights of transit
unimpeded by unilateral coastal. state claims. The right to research in the EEZ is
also in the U.S. naval interest.
The Informal Single Negotiating Text provides in Part II, Articles 45-61, for
a regime which could well satisfy the U.S. naval transit interest.4 8 Although it
does not recognize that the EEZ is high seas with special economic rights for the
coastal state, it does establish in Article 47, Section 1 that:
All states, whether coastal or land-locked, shall, subject to the relevant
provisions of the present Convention, enjoy in the exclusive economic zone
the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to
navigation and communication.
Vital here is the establishment of the "freedom" of navigation. Article 46 limits
the EEZ to 200 nautical mis0 and beyond that Part II, Article 75 provides for
"freedom of navigation" on the remaining high seas.s" Importantly, too, the
limit to the territorial sea is set at 12 nautical mi by Part II, Article 2. 52
Altogether, these provisions tend to protect the freedom of navigation for
warships and the right of overflight for aircraft beyond a 12-mi territorial limit.
As such, this would be a satisfactory resolution for U.S. naval interests. Coastal
states may, however, attempt to use the broad grants of power in the EEZ to
restrict naval transit. There is more to fear from unilateral coastal state claims
than there is from the rules in the Informal Single Negotiating Text. Once again,
it would seem that the Navy is better served by relying on the Law-of-the-Sea
Convention and on dispute settlement procedures than on the give and take of
the development of customary law by claim and counterclaim, action and
counteraction.
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A potential draw-back of a convention based on the Informal Single Negotiat-
ing Text for the Navy is Article 45, Section l(b)(ii), which gives the coastal state
the exclusive right to regulate scientific research in the EEZ. The freedom of
research is still in hot dispute in the law-of-the-sea negotiations and a more
favorable clause may eventually surface. Even if one did not, this restriction
would have to be balanced against the otherwise generally favorable provisions
of the territorial sea and EEZ provisions and against the facts that many of our
allies, e.g., Canada, Australia, and Japan, would have some of the largest EEZs
and that Soviet naval research would be significantly more impeded than our
own.
Should the United States, then, support or oppose the retention of the
military activities exception? The analysis would tend to show that the United
States should oppose the mere inclusion of the exception. No matter that Article
18, Section 2(c) was probably first visualized as a concession to the naval
powers, a recognition of sovereign immunity. The exception takes on an entirely
different complexion when included in the dispute settlement part. If a sover-
eign immunity clause is included in the substantive body of a convention as it
was in the 1973 London Convention and the 1974 Helsinki Convention or as it
is in Part II, Article 31, or Part Ill, Article 42, of the Informal Single Negotiating
Text, then it is truly a concession to sovereign immunity. But as an exception to
dispute settlement procedures it has the effect of removing naval operations
from the protection of impartial settlement and leaving them up to dispute by
unilateral coastal state claims. Although intended to be exercised by the naval
powers, Article 18, Section 2(c) could be chosen by coastal states which intend
to apply their own definitions of permissible naval conduct to naval passage
through straits or through territorial seas and economic zones. In crucial waters,
these coastal state definitions could well be more restrictive than commonly
accepted standards likely to be applied in arbitration or dispute settlement.
Considering the favorable nature of the Informal Single Negotiating Text with
regard to issues of importance to United States naval operations, the United
States would be better off trusting to the new Law-of-the-Sea Cbnvention and
dispute settlement procedures than to unilateral determinations of legal naval
conduct.
But if the military activities exception is retained, should the United States
elect it when ratifying the Law of the Sea Convention? The answer here again is
no. Article 18, Section 5 provides:
Any Contracting Party which has made a declaration under paragraph 2 shall
not be entitled to invoke any procedure excepted under such declaration in
relation to any excepted category of dispute against any other Contracting
Party.s5
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Thus, if the United States elects the military activities exception, the United
States will be unable to go into compulsory dispute settlement in any dispute
involving U.S. naval forces. If, for example, straits states resist U.S. naval passage
through Gibraltar or through the Indonesian straits, or if a coastal state should
claim that the operations of the United States Sixth or Seventh fleets in its EEZ
threaten the security of that state, the United States would be unable to resort
to arbitration or judicial settlement for a resolution of the dispute because this
country had declared for Article 18, Section 2(c). By electing this exception the
United States would be forfeiting an attractive and peaceful way of settling
maritime disputes concerning naval operations. A similar forfeiture has resulted
from the Connally Amendment reservation to the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.54
The potential mischief of the military activities exception is great. Naval
operations have been and will likely remain one of the most controversial
exercises of U.S. ocean power. As the United States reduces its military commit-
ments on land, it is likely to increasingly rely on ocean forces to maintain the
U.S. commitment to other countries and to act when necessary. As the Soviet
Navy grows, the possibilities of U.S./Soviet ocean confrontation increase and it
is more likely that states will venture to keep both superpower naval forces far
from their shores. Article 18, Section 2(c), by removing military activities from
dispute settlement procedures, removes one sort of activity almost certainly in
need of peaceful resolution.
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